What is it about?
This study investigates how Taiwan's 2005 electoral reform affected party unity and the behavior of legislators. Taiwan shifted from a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Under SNTV, voters cast one vote in multi-member districts, encouraging competition even within the same party. The MMM system, by contrast, introduced single-member districts (SMDs) alongside proportional representation (PR), reducing internal party competition and altering legislators' incentives. The research shows that district legislators elected under SNTV were more likely to prioritize local interests and deviate from the party line before the reform. After the reform, while district legislators still showed some independence, the overall level of party discipline increased significantly. This was particularly true for PR legislators, who now relied more on party endorsement for their election. Absences from legislative votes also became more common post-reform, especially among district legislators, as they focused on constituency service or avoided controversial issues. The study uses roll-call vote analysis and interviews to highlight these shifts, showing how party leadership enforces discipline and manages legislative behavior under the new system.
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Why is it important?
This work is timely and significant as it sheds light on how changes to electoral systems can reshape political dynamics and governance. By examining Taiwan's unique case, the study provides insights into the broader debate about mixed electoral systems worldwide. It emphasizes the growing importance of parties in modern democracies and how they can balance national and local interests under different systems. For policymakers, this research offers valuable lessons about how electoral design impacts representation, accountability, and political stability.
Perspectives
This article reflects years of dedicated research and engagement with Taiwan's legislative process. Writing it was particularly rewarding because it involved interviews with legislators who shared first-hand insights into how reforms impacted their roles and actions. This study contributes to the academic discussion on electoral systems and has practical implications for countries considering similar reforms. I hope this work sparks further debate on how to design electoral systems that ensure effective governance and fair representation.
Dr. Yu-Ceng Liao
Academia Sinica
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Party leadership, electoral reform, and mandate-divide, Japanese Journal of Political Science, May 2022, Cambridge University Press,
DOI: 10.1017/s1468109922000111.
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