How Cognitive Models Combine to Create Meaning

What is it about?

This article explores how different cognitive models—such as metaphors, metonymies, frames, and image schemas—interact to produce meaning in language. While traditional Cognitive Linguistics has studied these models mostly in isolation, this paper shows that many linguistic expressions can only be fully understood when we consider how several cognitive models combine to form conceptual complexes. These complexes arise when two or more cognitive models are integrated, producing richer meaning effects than any single model could yield on its own. The article examines metaphoric complexes, metonymic complexes, frame complexes, and image‑schematic complexes, offering detailed analyses of how combinations of models shape interpretation. It also provides an integrated account of phenomena such as fictive motion (“the road runs along the coast”) and image‑schema transformations, demonstrating that these can be understood as special cases of metonymic domain expansion and reduction. By doing so, the paper unifies previously disconnected areas of Cognitive Linguistics and offers a more powerful, predictive framework for analyzing figurative language and conceptualization.

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Photo by Maximilian Bungart on Unsplash

Photo by Maximilian Bungart on Unsplash

Why is it important?

This work is significant because it strengthens the explanatory power of Cognitive Linguistics. By demonstrating that conceptual metaphor and metonymy often operate jointly—and also in combination with frames and image schemas—the paper shows that meaning construction is a multi‑layered process, not adequately explained by isolated models. The introduction of conceptual complexes offers a more fine‑grained and flexible toolkit that allows researchers to analyze difficult cases that were previously handled either inconsistently or with overly complex theories such as Conceptual Blending. The paper also reconceptualizes phenomena like fictive motion and image‑schema transformations—traditionally treated as unrelated—by showing they rely on the same metonymic processes that structure many other aspects of meaning. This unification not only simplifies theoretical accounts but also provides linguists with a more systematic way to predict meaning effects. As a result, the article contributes to more elegant scientific generalizations and sets the stage for future empirical work on how humans mentally construct linguistic meaning.

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