Common Notions and Instincts as Sources of Moral Knowledge in Leibniz’s New Essays

What is it about?

Leibniz argues that innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. My emphasis is on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz.

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Photo by Cathryn Lavery on Unsplash

Photo by Cathryn Lavery on Unsplash

Why is it important?

There is little research on Leibniz's innateness and especially on how it is related to this practical philosophy. My paper introduces a new way to think about the relationship between human rational, distinct knowledge and non-distinct information founded on instincts.

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