What is it about?

Andrei Tarkovsky's film Solaris (1972) is studied through the lens of philosophy of mind. The question of memory and personhood, as developed by John Locke and then expanded by Derek Parfit, is applied to the status of Hari — the copy of the protagonist's deceased wife. The key question addressed by this paper is on what basis Hari can (or should?) be considered human. Hari's personhood is further analyzed in the context of Cartesian dualism, the response to Descartes by reductionism and the rebuttal of reductionism by the functionalist theories of Hilary Putnam. Descartes' thoughts on animal suffering and the bête-machine are pitted against Hari's experience in Solaris. The key question is whether Hari can be reduced to her alien structure or should be considered in terms of her behavior. The moral implications of these questions are extended to human sociality, human emotional response and the role of the body in the human condition.

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Why is it important?

As we transition into the era of AI and robotics, the artistic and philosophical exploration of the implications inherent in the interaction between human and non-human intelligence becomes an important tool for dealing with a new cognitive and moral landscape. This article explores the topic through the philosophical analysis of a film classic from the 20th century: Andrei Tarkovsky's Solaris (1972).

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This page is a summary of: Philosophy of Mind and Body in Andrei Tarkovsky's Solaris, Film-Philosophy, October 2016, Edinburgh University Press,
DOI: 10.3366/film.2016.0020.
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