What is it about?
This paper uses a well-known economics idea—Principal-Agent Theory—to explain how poor communication and pressure to meet goals helped cause the 1986 Challenger disaster. It shows how engineers raised safety concerns that NASA leaders overlooked. By combining this theory with real-world experience in aerospace, the paper helps young professionals spot warning signs and make better choices in high-pressure workplaces.
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Photo by NASA on Unsplash
Why is it important?
This work is unique because it looks at the Challenger disaster from different angles: economics, history, and workplace culture. It uses a theory about trust and decision-making (Principal-Agent Theory) along with real engineering records and personal experience. It shows how small communication problems and pressure to meet goals led to a major tragedy. This is important today as many young professionals face similar challenges in big organizations. The paper helps people spot hidden problems that can lead to bad decisions.
Perspectives
Researching, writing, and discussing this paper with experts was incredibly fulfilling. I began this journey while reflecting on a personal ethical dilemma I faced at Boeing as a young professional. I describe how doing the right thing, especially in defense of safety, can be a clear decision, but it often comes at a high personal cost when it goes against management’s priorities. The way we make decisions in a new workplace often comes from the values we’ve learned before, but those can clash with unclear or conflicting expectations in a new organizational culture. I hope this piece helps young professionals recognize early warning signs, trust their judgment, and act in ways that serve both their integrity and the greater mission: safety.
Ms. Stephanie Butron
George Mason University
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Thinking Critically About Historical Failures: How Young Professionals Can Expand Their Innovation and Problem-Solving Capacities, January 2025, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA),
DOI: 10.2514/6.2025-2449.
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