L. S. Klejn and R. G. Collingwood on History, Archaeology, and Detection

What is it about?

R.G. Collingwood argued that the work of the historian is similar to that of the detective. Using the work of the archaeologist L.S. Klejn, I argue that it would be more accurate to say that the work of the archaeologist is similar to that of the detective. R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) was a philosopher who was also a practising archaeologist and historian. His philosophy did not merge with his activities as an archaeologist and historian but, as a philosopher, he was nonetheless extremely interested in what he did within these other disciplines. As a philosopher of history Collingwood was less concerned with laying down a prescriptive methodology for other historians to follow than in isolating the logical form of a successful historical explanation. He argued that the rational nature of the historian’s subject matter deeply influences the structure of historical explanation. Thus, according to Collingwood, when the historian claims to have discovered the cause of an action this involves a claim to have reconstructed its underlying rationale (as understood by the historical agent at the time). This is entirely different to the form that explanation takes in the natural sciences. That said, there is a section of Collingwood’s posthumously published The Idea of History (1946) in which he shifts from examining the logical form of a historical explanation to the problem of how to reconstruct a series of past events. The section in question is entitled ‘Who killed John Doe?’ and consists of a fictional detective story. This is followed by the claim that the methods of the detective and the historian are essentially the same, but with the following caveat. The methods of criminal detection are not at every point identical with those of scientific history, because, their ultimate purpose is not the same. A criminal court has in its hands the life and liberty of a citizen, and in a country where the citizen is regarded as having rights the court is therefore bound to do something and do it quickly. (The Idea of History, 268) By contrast: the historian is under no obligation to make up his mind within any stated time. Nothing matters to him except that his decision, when he reaches it, shall be right: which means, for him, that it shall follow inevitably from the evidence. (The Idea of History, 268) In making this claim, the first mistake that Collingwood makes is to conflate the work of the detective with the work of the judiciary. It is not within the remit of the detective to pronounce upon the guilt or the innocence of his suspects. The second mistake is the claim that “the historian is under no obligation to make up his mind within any stated time.” The historian is not immune to the pressure of deadlines. Even if he has no other deadline, he will have to face the deadline of his own mortality. But whereas the historian has the luxury of suggestion, the criminal court does not. The judge’s decision does not take the form of a suggestion. It is therefore more important that a court’s decision should be right “beyond reasonable doubt” (rather than that the decision of the historian should attain this level of near certainty). If, in court, no decision can be reached beyond reasonable doubt, the verdict must be “not guilty” or, under some judicial systems, “not proven”. It is the court – and not the historian – that must deal in near certainties. By contrast, the historian has the luxury of suggestion, and is able to leave it to future historians, with new evidence, to strengthen or weaken the plausibility of that suggestion. But, to return to ‘Who killed John Doe?’, Collingwood’s third mistake is arguably to compare the historian to the detective. I would argue that it would be more accurate to compare the archaeologist to the detective. For, as Collingwood stresses throughout his work on explanations in history, the historian’s explanation is focused on the question of ‘why?’ whereas in the story of John Doe the detective’s focus is primarily on ‘what happened?’. The question of ‘why?’ might be relevant to the investigation but answering that question is only important insofar as it helps the detective to answer the question of ‘what happened?’ (and ‘who did it?). In this respect, Collingwood’s detective story better illustrates L.S. Klejn’s description of archaeology than Collingwood’s description of history. The Russian archaeologist L.S. Klejn (1927-2019) may well have written more about the comparison between archaeology and detection, and the difference between history and archaeology, than any other archaeologist (or philosopher). In brief, Klejn draws a methodological distinction between archaeology and history. He does not draw the distinction along a timeline, with the end of archaeology coinciding with the advent of written records. Klejn argues that the archaeologist attempts to answer the questions ‘who, what, where, whence, wither, how and why’ but, of these questions, the question ‘why?’ is subordinate to the others. It is in this respect that the archaeologist is like the detective. By contrast, the historian is primarily interested in the question ‘why?’ The fundamental task of the archaeologist is the reconstruction of events. Once a hypothetical reconstruction is achieved it is made available to the historian for further processing. The description of this handover can be, Klejn admits, a sensitive issue. But the handover does not imply that either discipline is in any way inferior to the other. Archaeology could equally well be described as either the servant or the mother of history. Nor is there anything to say that the same person cannot be both a historian and an archaeology. But conceptually, these disciplines are distinct – albeit with extremely close ‘business relations.’ The comparison with the detective highlights the difference. Once the detective has established ‘who fired the gun?’ the further question of ‘why?’ is not pursued, although it is likely to be discussed by the jury. The archaeologist and the detective are concerned with what is typical about a case, and they often make use of typologies. The historian is more concerned with what is unique about a case. But that is not to say that the practice of archaeology and detection is just a matter of unimaginatively following established procedures. A flash of inspiration is as useful in archaeology and detection as it is in history, and an awareness of one’s own actions is invaluable. It should be added that the difference between Collingwood and Klejn is focused on the comparison with detection. On historical explanation, they are in broad agreement: Klejn agrees with Collingwood that historical explanation involves affording the historical agent a plausible motive. However, Collingwood never discussed, at any length, the distinction between history and archaeology. Klejn does. Furthermore, he discusses how history might be related to archaeology, with close “business relations.” It is important to be clear about this relationship, and the difference between history and archaeology, because it has an impact on other discussions such as the extent and the manner in which these disciplines are humanistic.

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