The Battle of Tigranokerta, Lucullus, and Cataphracts A Re-Assessment

What is it about?

This article deals with the Roman-Armenian war of 69-67 B.C. and the role played by the heavy Oriental cavalry called the cataphracts, and other cavalry branches. Ancient sources which are related to this war provide insights into the political arrangements, alliances, and strategies from both sides of the conflict. Tigranes the Great, king of Armenia, refused to give up his father-in-law Mithradates Eupator to the Romans. Therefore the Roman commander Lucullus advanced beyond the Euphrates and proceeded toward the new metropolis of Tigranocerta. The Roman forces defeated a numerous army of Tigranes at the battle of Tigranokerta in 69 B.C., and afterwards sacked the city. In scholarly studies, the accounts of Sallust, Plutarch and some other sources on the encounter at Tigranokerta have become the starting point for numerous conclusions, often misleading, regarding the then military operation and the part played by the units of cataphracts. The evaluation of the source data leads to a re-assessment of the picture of the war in Armenia.

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Photo by Birmingham Museums Trust on Unsplash

Photo by Birmingham Museums Trust on Unsplash

Why is it important?

Without understanding the sources referring to the battle of Tigranokerta (chiefly Plutarch’s description in his Life of Lucullus, based on Sallust) one falls into misinterpretations regarding the tactical role of cataphracts.The description of cataphracts in Plutarch and their grotesquely depicted defeat are the product of Roman propaganda shaped by and for Lucullus. Besides, Plutarch’s and Sallust’s tendentiousness involves, for instance, providing a false disproportion between the Armenian and Roman forces at Tigranokerta. Tigranes is supposed to have had an enormous army of about 250-300,000 thousand soldiers, and Lucullus only 10,000. In the Life of Lucullus, Plutarch blindly reports false data about the size of the armies and the losses, uncritically accepting the penchant of Lucullus for the grotesque underestimation of casualties and his silence of defeats. Wrong interpretation of sources leads to incorrect conclusions. Therefore, the opinion that the cataphracts at Tigranokerta “demonstrated once again the ineffectiveness of these troops against the legions” is not tenable. The cataphracts did not even have time to take part in the battle, and the commo￾tion caused them to retreat. The battle of Carrhae (53 B.C.) proved that an appropriately used corps of cataphracts combined with mounted archers was able to defeat both the Roman legions and all types of cavalry. The battle of Tigranokerta was not a disaster for the cataphracts, as Plutarch suggests, but it was for Tigranes as a commander.

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