Roman and Byzantine Border Security Strategies

What is it about?

The debate on the existence and nature of a "grand Roman strategy" received a new life with the publication of Edward Luttwak's book The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. He argued that under Diocletian and Constantine Rome developed a "defense in depth" strategy (reserve forces well behind borders to deal with incursions) compared to two earlier approaches characterized as "expansive" and "preclusive." Peter Heather has argued that political and propaganda needs of individual emperors played a greater role than rational planning. This chapter focuses on variations of approach based on the exigencies of specific circumstances. A few examples may suffice to illustrate the approach. On the Danube front under Diocletian advanced types of fortifications have been identified. Campaigns against and population resettlements of defeated insurgents were common. Constantine bridged the Danube at Oescus, adding a fort, in 328. There was relative peace on the Danube frontier until 367. Valens then began a three-year campaign which resulted in ending subsidy payments to the Goths. Justinian's campaigns in North Africa, Italy and Spain have been viewed as designed to restore geographically the old Roman empire. Another view sees them as an attempt to restore the emperor's lost credibility and religious in origin. The resources committed to the campaigns seem less than needed for conquest. Leo VI in his Taktika (about 905) warns against pitched battle, even with superior forces, but advocates attacking Arab raiders when they are exhausted and returning from Byzantine territory burdened with booty. Hence a "permeable" border. Jonathan Shepard has suggested that Alexios Komnenos' limited goal of recovering only recently-lost territory vs. expansion reflects a personal style, employing the combination of diplomacy with personal campaigns.

Featured Image

Photo by David Köhler on Unsplash

Photo by David Köhler on Unsplash

Why is it important?

The numerous variations of Roman and Byzantine approaches to the borders of the empire suggest that practical methods adapted to immediate individual circumstances were the norm of strategy.