Aesthetic autonomy and the beholder's share

What is it about?

Following Juliane Rebentisch’s lead, the paper proposes that installation art transgresses not so much the idea of autonomous art, but an objectivist misunderstanding of it. Rebentisch’s position recasts aesthetic autonomy not as a self-sufficiency of the object, but as a semblance (bracketed from the spheres of practical and theoretical reason) that forces us to confront the ethical and political situation where we encounter the artwork. Such an argument is reminiscent of aspects of Wolfgang Iser’s writing on literature. However, like Iser (and against Rebentisch) I allocate a central role for the imagination – not only in problematizing the beholder’s orientation towards the installation, but in negotiating the inherently unstable relation between the perceptive engagement of the 'real' situation and the 'virtual' realm of the artwork.

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Why is it important?

The paper helps to clarify the significance of Juliane Rebentisch’s position on aesthetic autonomy, but to extend her analysis of installation art to take account of the beholder's orientation towards the artwork in question. Together with the other articles in the symposium section of the JAAC, the paper contributes to the philosophical framing of installation art.

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