What is it about?

In this study, I show how accounting information can be used by newly-elected politicians for achieving political goals through the accusation of predecessors for causing financial failures. I explain how this was done in three relevant Italian cases in which a political alternation occurred. The study suggests that discretion in producing and using accounting information as well as weak public auditors are contextual facilitators for this type of accounting information (mis)use. Free online access at this link: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/KnacuKqR4mrHu2qAWzYt/full

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Why is it important?

The main consequence of a political (mis)use of accounting information is that the general public is misinformed, which might be contributing to the crises of political communication and political legitimacy that several Western countries are undergoing. I suggest three strategies for discouraging a political (mis)use of accounting information: 1) improving the quality of accounting standards; 2) allowing public auditors to play a stronger role in the media; 3) strengthening the independence of public auditors.

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This page is a summary of: The day after: newly-elected politicians and the use of accounting information, Public Money & Management, September 2016, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2016.1237135.
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