What is it about?
Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability” and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.
Featured Image
Photo by Sonika Agarwal on Unsplash
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Internal Realism, Religious Pluralism and Ontology, Philosophia, October 2007, Springer Science + Business Media,
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-007-9089-1.
You can read the full text:
Contributors
The following have contributed to this page