All Stories

  1. The Ant and the Grasshopper: Does Biased Cognition Compromise Agency in the Case of Delusions and Conspiracy Theories?
  2. How we can improve young people experience of interactions with mental health professionals.
  3. Which negative stereotypes are associated wirh people who hear voices and why are they harmful?
  4. Revisiting delusions to demystify human agency: A response to critics
  5. Understanding delusions to improve our mutual interactions: A précis of <i>"Why Delusions Matter"</i>
  6. Implying implausibility and undermining versus accepting peoples’ experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm in Emergency Department psychosocial assessments
  7. Why We Should Be Curious about Each Other
  8. Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories?
  9. Delusions across and beyond Diagnoses
  10. On the moral psychology of the pandemic agent
  11. A Journey into the Mind
  12. Why Delusions Matter
  13. Challenges and achievements for Philosophical Psychology
  14. Putting scientific realism into perspective
  15. Sharing responsibility for conspiracy beliefs: The agency-in-context model
  16. Are delusions pathological beliefs?
  17. Communication in youth mental health clinical encounters: Introducing the agential stance
  18. Debating Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Death in People with Psychiatric Disorders
  19. The Epistemic Relevance of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
  20. The appeal and challenges of an integrative approach to psychiatry
  21. Agency-First Epistemology of Psychedelics
  22. Correction to: Invasion genetics of the Asian hornet Vespa velutina nigrithorax in Southern Europe
  23. Exceptionalism at the Time of covid-19: Where Nationalism Meets Irrationality
  24. A newPhilosophical Psychology
  25. Stories as evidence
  26. Do delusions have and give meaning?
  27. Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs
  28. Delusions in the two-factor theory
  29. Doctors without ‘Disorders’
  30. Book review symposium: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
  31. Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance?
  32. Introduction: Philosophical Perspectives on Confabulation
  33. Instrumental rationality and suicide in schizophrenia: a case for rational suicide?
  34. The Power of Stories: Responsibility for the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Mental Health Debates
  35. Are clinical delusions adaptive?
  36. Why (Some) Unrealistic Optimism is Permissible in Patient Decision Making
  37. “Good” Biases: Does Doxastic Irrationality Benefit Individuals and Groups?
  38. Commentary: What aspects of good practice in early interventions in psychosis can be codified in guidelines? – A commentary on Corsico et al. (2018)
  39. Optimism, Agency, and Success
  40. T113. THE LINK BETWEEN BLUNTED AFFECT AND SUICIDE IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
  41. The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
  42. Can delusions play a protective role?
  43. Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs
  44. Delusions in Context
  45. The Bright Side of Memory Errors
  46. Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation
  47. How can false or irrational beliefs be useful?
  48. Unrealistic optimism – Its nature, causes and effects
  49. What is unrealistic optimism?
  50. Depressive delusions
  51. Philip Gerrans, The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014, 304 pp., £27.95 (hardback) ISBN: 978-0262027557
  52. Moral Preferences
  53. Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions
  54. Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia
  55. The Ethics of Delusional Belief
  56. The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
  57. Costs and Benefits of Imperfect Cognitions
  58. Costs and benefits of realism and optimism
  59. Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry
  60. Natural and para-natural kinds in psychiatry
  61. Taking the long view: an emerging framework for translational psychiatric science
  62. NikolajNottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, xii + 258 pp., GBP 55 (Hardback), ISBN 9781137026514.
  63. The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions
  64. Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case
  65. Rationality and Sanity
  66. Sentience, Moral Relevance of
  67. The relative importance of undesirable truths
  68. Rationality and self-knowledge in delusion and confabulation: implications for autonomy as self-governance
  69. Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions
  70. Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain
  71. Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory?
  72. Does reflection lead to wise choices?
  73. Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs
  74. In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions
  75. The right not to know: the case of psychiatric disorders
  76. Psychiatric Classification and Diagnosis: Delusions and Confabulations
  77. Continuing Commentary: Shaking the Bedrock
  78. Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study
  79. What's wrong with ‘mental’ disorders?
  80. Natural versus Assisted Reproduction: In Search of Fairness
  81. Agency, Life Extension, and the Meaning of Life
  82. ‘Faultless’ ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation
  83. Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs
  84. The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving
  85. IMMORTALITY WITHOUT BOREDOM
  86. Review of Evnine, Simon J., Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. viii + 176, £32.50 (cloth)
  87. Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: An overview
  88. The future of scientific psychiatry
  89. Reproductive and parental autonomy: an argument for compulsory parental education
  90. Neurophilosophy at Work * By PAUL CHURCHLAND
  91. Review: Rachel Cooper: Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science
  92. Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving
  93. Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances?
  94. Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry By Tim Thornton. Oxford University Press. 2007. £19.95 (pb). ISBN 9780199228713
  95. A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion
  96. Rationality and Compulsion. By Lennart Nordenfelt. Oxford University Press. 2007. 224pp. £29.95 (pb). ISBN 9780199214853
  97. WHAT DOES FIDO BELIEVE?
  98. Delimiting the concept of research: an ethical perspective
  99. Large Scale Surveys for Policy Formation and Research–a Study in Inconsistency
  100. Disputes Over Moral Status: Philosophy and Science in the Future of Bioethics
  101. Moral Rights and Human Culture
  102. Deception in Psychology: Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge
  103. Animal rights, animal minds, and human mindreading
  104. Embryos and Eagles: Symbolic Value in Research and Reproduction
  105. An Ethical Framework for Stem Cell Research in the European Union
  106. INTENTIONALITY WITHOUT RATIONALITY
  107. Delusions and the Background of Rationality
  108. Stem cell research, personhood and sentience
  109. Discussion (day 1 session 1): Assisted conception and moral philosophy
  110. Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution
  111. Marks of Irrationality
  112. Delusion